1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3	FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
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5	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * C.A. NO. 00-105L
6	EFRAT UNGAR, et al
7	* 2:05 P.M. THE PALESTINIAN *
8	LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, * et al
9	* PROVIDENCE, RI * * * * * * * * * * *
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11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE RONALD R. LAGUEUX
12	SENIOR JUDGE
13	(Motion for Preliminary Injunction)
14	VOLUME II
15 16	
17	APPEARANCES:
18	ATTEANANCE .
19	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MAX WISTOW, ESQ.
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19 NOVEMBER 2010 -- 2:05 P.M.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. Will the attorneys identify themselves for the record again, please.

MR. STRACHMAN: David Strachman for the Plaintiffs-Judgment Creditors.

MR. WISTOW: Max Wistow for the Plaintiffs.

MR. HILL: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Brian Hill for the Defendants.

MR. SHERMAN: Deming Sherman for the Defendants.

THE COURT: The matter before the Court in this case, Ungar v. The Palestinian Authority, Civil Action 00-105L, is a request for preliminary injunction by the Plaintiffs against the Palestinian Authority from taking any actions to collect or enforce any debt owed by Orascom Telecom to the Palestinian -- Palestine Investment Fund, PIF, until the judgment entered in this action on July 13, 2004, is satisfied in full or until further order of Court.

The standard for determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction is well established in the First Circuit, and I'll cite two cases where I was the Trial Judge: Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc., v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 Fed 3d 12, First Circuit 1996; and Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, G-u-i-l-b-e-r-t,

934 Federal 2d 4, First Circuit 1991. And there's been a whole raft of other cases.

The Plaintiff, in order to get a preliminary injunction, has to satisfy a four-part test. The first part is that there's a likelihood of success on the merits; the second is the potential for irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; third, the balance of relevant impositions to hardship to the non-Movant if enjoined, as contrasted with the hardship to the Movant if no injunction issues; and, finally, the effect, if any, of the Court's ruling on the public interest.

What is significant in this case is that, after the Court issued its judgment on a Creditor's Bill awarding the ownership of what I will call the first PIF to the Plaintiffs because the sole owner was the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Authority and its officers later created what I call the new PIF.

The Plaintiffs took control of the first PIF, but they've had no way of taking control of the new PIF. And it's the new PIF that is operating now as an arm of the Palestinian Authority.

Let me state right now that, no matter what the motive was for creating the new PIF, there was nothing wrong with the PA creating a new PIF so it could acquire funds for its operations in the Middle East.

And it's the new PIF that's involved here. Of course this Court has no jurisdiction over the new PIF, and an Egyptian Court has ordered Orascom to pay its debt of some 45 million to, I presume, the new PIF. I haven't seen that judgment.

So what the Plaintiffs want me to do is to preliminarily enjoin the PA from doing anything by way of interference in the new PIF collecting that debt. Its motive for doing that is unclear to me. If I enjoin the PA from doing anything, what if the new PIF transfers some of those funds to the PA to allow the PA to perform its operations?

The Plaintiffs have done a lot in the courts in Israel. They've succeeded in freezing large sums of money that the country of Israel would normally pay to the PA to allow the PA to continue its operations and perform its functions.

So there is -- although that is still in some litigation, those funds are frozen, and the PA has no way of getting that money at the moment unless that order gets reversed by the Supreme Court of Israel. So I can understand why they created the new PIF, so they would have a way of getting funds to operate.

I won't keep you in suspense. I am not going to issue a preliminary injunction in this case against the

PA because the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy at least three of the parts of the four-part framework.

First of all, there's been a failure to show that these Plaintiffs would succeed on the merits in somehow getting control of those funds. They've had ample time to try to do that in the appropriate courts in the Middle East but have failed to do that.

And if I granted the injunction to the PA, the argument would be made that the new PIF could not transfer funds to the PA, and that would not be my intention at all, to prevent that. And it would be a round-about way of getting me to enjoin the new PIF.

That would be the net effect of it.

Secondly, there -- as I see it, there is no potential for irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs. They have an adequate remedy at law. This involves money, not some unique object, and they already have that attachment, or whatever it may be called, of Israel's debt to the PA. And they have adequate remedy at law in the Israeli courts.

The third standard, what Judge Selya sometimes calls the balancing of equities, is really the balancing of harms. And, again, for the same reason, I think there would be great harm done if this injunction was issued to the Palestinian Authority and the PIF,

the new PIF, while there's a minimum of harm to the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs can still pursue various attachment remedies in the Israel courts, and they still have that frozen block of cash available to pay a judgment in this case.

As I've said throughout, this is a Court of limited jurisdiction generally and specifically in this case because it only has jurisdiction over the PA.

The Court has gone about as far as it can go in granting the Creditor's Bill to reach and apply the PA's sole interest in the old PIF. I don't know what that resulted in, in terms of securing assets.

It would only be a fraud on the Court if the PA managed to siphon assets out after the Plaintiffs took control through the new PIF. But based on the evidence that I have before me, which is limited, it seems to me the new PIF is only dealing with new funds, which includes this \$45 million.

So, for all those reasons, I am denying the Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction against the Palestinian Authority from collecting or enforcing any debt owed by Orascom to the Palestinian Investment Fund, the new Palestinian Investment Fund, or to the Palestinian Authority.

If circumstances change or there's new or better evidence secured by the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs can move to set the matter down for hearing on permanent injunction.

There are cases where the Court in the past has denied a motion for preliminary injunction and then when the case was heard on the merits on permanent injunction, the Court found enough evidence to issue a permanent injunction. The Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert is one of those examples. And Judge Selya affirmed me in that case.

The party losing the battle on likelihood of success on the merits with respect to a claim for preliminary injunction may nevertheless win the war at the succeeding trial on the merits.

So I will not issue a preliminary injunction, and I will not set the matter down for permanent injunction unless one of the parties makes a motion to that effect.

That's the order of the Court.

The Clerk will note that in the minutes.

Are there any comments anyone wishes to make?

MR. WISTOW: No, Your Honor, except thank you

for seeing us at your home on the TRO.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

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Nothing at this time, Your Honor.
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              MR. HILL:
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              THE COURT:
                           All right. We'll take a recess.
               (Court concluded at 2:18 p.m.)
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                      <u>C E R T I F I C A T I O N</u>
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                  I, Debra D. Lajoie, RPR-FCRR-CRI-RMR, do
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       hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and
       accurate transcription of my stenographic notes in the
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       above-entitled case.
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                        /s/ Debra D. Lajoie
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